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Abstract
This article contributes to the international corporate governance literature by examining
factors that affect CEO compensation in China. The article models of CEO pay based on an
understanding of the unique economic and structural reforms undertaken by the privatized State
Owned Enterprises. The findings show that CEO compensation depends, in part, on the firm’s
operating profits and this indicates that incentive systems are being used to motivate top
managers. Corporate governance factors have a significant impact on CEO compensation, but
they do so in ways that differ from those in other countries. Our conclusions are robust across
different formulations of the basic model and they have public policy implications for China and
other transitional economies that are moving away from state ownership of business enterprises.
Keywords: Ownership ; board structure; executive compensation.
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How Ownership and Corporate Governance Influence
Chief Executive Pay in China’s Listed Firms
1. Introduction
The literature documents well China’s economic reforms and the privatization of its industrial
enterprises (e.g., Li et al., 2004). Paradoxically, strong economic growth, fueled by pent-up domestic
demand and burgeoning exports, is accompanied by poor corporate performance using accounting
and stock market measures of success (Chen et al., 1998). Three reasons put forward for firms’poor
performances are the government’s interference with commercial decisions, poor corporate
governance, and the lack of incentives for top managers (Chen et al., 2006).
This article sheds light on the incentive issue by examining the compensation of CEOs in
China’s listed firms. In particular, we investigate whether a CEO’s pay depends on the firm’s
performance and whether ownership and boardroom characteristics have an impact on both pay and
the pay-for-performance relation. The article identifies the main influences on CEO pay and critique
the apparent pay processes used by firms. Now is an opportune time to examine CEO compensation
in China as the listed company experiment has been in operation for more than 10 years. We need to
learn lessons from the past and make recommendations that will assist future policy making.
The findings show a positive pay-performance relation in China when performance is
measured as return on assets. Thus, firms reward their CEOs when their firms have good operating
profits. In contrast, stock returns do not relate with CEO compensation. The article provides evidence
that state ownership acts to reduce compensation levels and the presence of a foreign shareholder acts
to increase pay levels. Foreign- invested firms have higher pay-for-performance sensitivities. Internal

governance does have an impact on CEO compensation. Firms with large boards of directors pay
their CEOs less, firms with a lot of non-executive directors are more likely to use performance-based
pay, and a firm that has a joint CEO -chairman position is less likely to use performance-based pay.
The article has the following structure. Section 2 provides a brief description of China’s
privatization program and discusses how top executive rewa rd systems have changed. Section 3
reviews the theoretical foundations of CEO pay and develops hypotheses about the determinants of
executive compensation in China. Section 4 describes the research method. Section 5 reports the
empirical results. Section 6 discusses the results and Part 7 concludes the paper and discusses the
policy implications and the limitations of the study.
2. Institutional background
The reorganization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) is a key ingredient in the economic
modernization of China. Here, the operational activities of many, but not all, SOEs are reorganized
into companies with share capital and profit making objectives. Many of the corporatized enterprises
have subsequently sold shares to the public (a process called privatization) and these shares have
been listed on the stock market. However in many cases the government has retained a significant
ownership stake1 , which often amounts to effective control. In 2001 the government introduced a
plan to sell off the state’s remaining shares in listed firms (the so-called second stage of privatization)
but this was shelved after strong protests from private investors. The private investors were
concerned that the sale of state shares would flood the market and stock prices would plummet. In
2005 the government resurrected the plan to sell state shares in listed firms and made the plan more
palatable for private investors by reducing the number of new IPOs (thereby reducing the supply of
other new shares) and requiring firms to compensate private investors (the compensation will be
1

When the government keeps an ownership interest a more apt description is partial privatization. In common with other

studies we use the more simple term privatization.

mainly by way of issuing bonus shares). The reorganization of listed firms has been modeled on U.S.
corporations in a bold attempt to instill western-style discipline and incentives (Tam, 2000). For
example, managers have more discretion in making business decisions and they are held accountable
to stockholders rather than to the state and the political hierarchy. Evidence suggests that this
objective has met with only partial success (Chen et al., 2006).
After the economic reforms began, managers were given more autonomy and incentive pay
systems began to appear (Groves et al., 1994). In the early 1980s the government introduced a
contract responsibility system (CRS) for SOEs. Under the CRS, managers were rewarded if the
SOE’s performance exceeded expectations (as laid out in the contract). Firms that earned higher
profits than expected were able to retain the surplus and managers were paid bonuses based on that
surplus. Although there were problems with the CRS (Chen et al., 1998) it did sow the seed for
further developments in reward systems.
In the early- and mid-1990s the top manager of the SOE (or unit of a SOE) became the CEO
of the company once it listed and their pay was a function of the civil service grade that they
occupied. Incentive and reward systems were considered to be quite weak during this time (see
Huang and Zhang, 1995; Qian, 1995; Yang, 1998; and Zheng, 1998). As the reform process evolved,
pay levels departed from civil service rates and became more varied across firms. An embryonic
labor market has developed and CEO turnover is quite high (Firth et al., 2006). CEOs are
increasingly being appointed from outside the firm. Managerial compensation is decided by the board
of directors and does not need the approval of stockholders. During the time of our study,
compensation committees did not exist.
Share ownership by CEOs and executive directors is very low (Xu, 2004) and their main
source of income is from cash compensation. In 1999, the government considered allowing listed
firms to offer stock options to the CEO and other senior managers. However, after much debate, the

government decided against allowing this practice. One reason for not allowing executive stock
options is that there is no source from which to give shares to the executives who wish to exercise
their options; treasury stock (share repurchases) is not allowed and any new issue of shares (to give to
the executives) requires regulatory approval, which is difficult to get. The lack of executive stock
options is one reason why share ownership by CEOs and top managers is so low. The absence of
executive stock options removes one method of aligning the interests of managers and the
shareholders (we note, however, that the use of stock options in the U.S. has been subject to criticism
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004)).
A major prerequisite to having a vibrant stock market is good corporate governance. This is
especially so in China where most listed firms have a dominant or controlling shareholder. To
promote good corporate governance, China’s stock market regulator, the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC), issued The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Firms in China. The
Code lays out detailed standards to which firms should adhere and it is similar in many respects to
codes of governance in other markets (e.g., Hong Kong, the U.K.). Despite the good intentions of the
Code, there are conflicting views on how well they have been accepted or implemented by firms and
there are also conflicting views on whether they have had a good effect on firms’performances (Bai
et al., 2003; Lin, 2000). .
3. Theoretical foundation and hypotheses
Because relatively little is known about how top management compensation is actually set in
Chinese listed firms our hypotheses are exploratory in nature. We draw upon our knowledge of
China’s reforms to guide us in formulating the hypotheses and we buttress this with information
gained from interviewing company officers. China’s corporate reforms are aimed at emulating
practices in North America and Europe and so we draw on the international literature on executive
pay in deriving the hypotheses. We focus on whether performance drives CEO pay (pay contingent

on performance). Additional research questions are whether the type of share owner and the
boardroom characteristics have an impact on pay and the pay-for-performance relation.
3.1.

Performance
Senior managers in China were brought up in a socialist environment where economic

efficiency and corporate profitability were secondary to fulfilling government objectives. With the
transformation to a market economy it is imperative that these senior managers refocus their efforts
on maximizing profits and shareholder value (Cragg and Dyck, 2000; Wolfram, 1998). In order to
induce CEOs to maximize shareholder wealth, firms need to introduce efficient incentive systems.
One such system is to tie remuneration to firm performance. This pay- for-performance link is a basic
tenet of principal-agent theory (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). We hypothesize that the CEO’s
compensation depends on the firm’s financial performance. The hypothesis is predicated on the
following stylized facts. First, in the early part of the reforms there is documented evidence that top
management pay in SOEs depends on performance (Groves et al., 1994; Mengistae and Xu, 2004).
We believe this practice is expanded after the SOEs are privatized. Second, the intent of the reforms
is to emulate practices in the U.S. and other capitalist countries, includ ing the adoption of
performance-related pay for CEOs 2 . Third, sections 77 and 78 of The Code of Corporate Governance
for Listed Firms in China states that a manager’s salary should reflect the company’s performance.
The Code is very influential. The hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: A CEO’s compensation depends on the firm’s performance.

2

However, we note that some empirical research in Britain, the U.S., and elsewhere, has resulted in mixed findings on the

pay-for-performance relation (e.g., Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Core et al., 1999; Gregg et al., 1993).

3.2.

Ownership, governance structure, and CEO pay
Corporate governance relates to the way a firm is directed and controlled. The form of the

governance structure is important when ownership is separated from management. When managers
are given considerable, if not unbridled, autonomy they may engage in self-serving behavior that
detracts from shareholder wealth. In order to monitor and, where necessary, control the actions of
professional managers, firms have developed governance and reporting mechanisms. In the case of
top management pay, CEOs and executive directors have incentives to award themselves high levels
of compensation. In response to possible excessive pay, Cadbury (1992), Hampel (1998), Greenbury
(1995), and others, urge firms to adopt a set of recommended practices and decision- making
mechanisms. Good corporate governance includes active oversight by investors and the appointment
of independent directors.
China’s listed firms have unique ownership structures. In almost all firms there is a dominant
shareholder who has significant influence over the way a firm is run and on the appointment and pay
of the CEO. Xu (2004) shows that, on average, the largest shareholder in a firm owns 43% of the
issued shares, while the second largest owns less than 5%; thus the largest shareholder usually has
effective control of the firm. Furthermore, the state is the largest shareholder in many listed firms. For
these firms, the CEO is often a state bureaucrat who is seconded to the firm (and who returns to the
state ministry from whence they came when their term as CEO ends). As state bureaucrats receive
relatively low salaries we believe that their pay as a CEO at a listed firm will be lower than the CEOs
at firms where the controlling shareholder is not the state. This leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: CEO pay is lower when the firm is controlled by the state.
The state has been characterized as being a poor monitor of a firm’s financial performance
because they are too detached from the firm (Shleifer, 1998). Moreover, the state may pressure the
firm to pursue objectives other than profit maximization (e.g., to increase employment). These

reasons suggest that state controlled firms are less likely to adopt performance-related pay schemes
for the CEO. To test this relation we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2A: The positive relation between CEO pay and performance will be weaker in
firms whose controlling shareholder is the state.
In China, the major shareholder is considered to be an insider and this shareholder has a
crucial say in the appointment and remuneration of the CEO. This power can lead to abuses unless
there is effective monitoring by outside investors. In capitalist economies, outside investors monitor
management actions and can take steps to discipline or remove poorly performing executives. The
costs of this monitoring role are quite high, however, and so in practice it is only large investors who
can afford to actively intervene in a company’s affairs (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1986; Khan et al., 2005). In contrast, when ownership is dispersed there is greater
managerial power and CEOs can award themselves higher pay (Firth et al., 1999). While China has
no direct equivalent to the type of institutional investors seen in the U.S., there are large outside
shareholders who are independent of the largest s hareholder. We hypothesize that these large outside
investors will help constrain abuses that lead to ‘
excessive’CEO pay and they will encourage the use
of performance-related compensation schemes. This leads to our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relation between CEO compensation and the voting strength
of large outside investors.
Hypothesis 3A: The positive relation between CEO pay and firm performance is stronger
when large outside shareholders have higher ownership.
Some Chinese listed firms are allowed to issue shares to international investors (these are
called B-shares). In order to induce foreign investors to buy its shares, a firm is more likely to adopt
international standards of governance and business practices. Foreign investors are likely to pressure
firms to hire better qualified CEOs who have international experience. These managers are able to

negotiate higher pay. We also believe that foreign investors will exert pressure on firms to use
performance-related pay schemes to reward their CEOs. The two foreign investor hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relation between CEO compensation and the presence of
foreign ownership.
Hypothesis 4A: The positive relation between CEO pay and firm performance will be stronger
if the firm has foreign shareholders.
The board of directors is responsible for the internal governance of firms and it has oversight
over the CEO’s compensation. As a consequence of this, the characteristics of the board have been
used to help exp lain top executive pay in North America, Europe, and many developed countries. For
example, a more independent board may act to restrain ‘excessive’CEO pay (Boyd, 1994; Lambert et
al., 1993) and to insist on linking the pay to the firm’s performance. Howe ver, some studies find that
independent directors inflate a CEO’s pay (Firth et al., 1999). This might arise because the
independent non-executive directors use the high pay for the CEO as a comparison benchmark when
they negotiate or renegotiate their remuneration at the firms or organizations where they work fulltime. Thus they have an incentive for average executive pay to rise. Large boards of directors are
likely to have a wider level of expertise although they can become so unwieldy that they become
ineffective in monitoring the CEO (Jensen, 1993). Core et al. (1999) find that large boards are
associated with excessive CEO pay. Some firms have the same person occupying the positions of
CEO and chairman of the board. In this circumstance, the CEO/chairman has a lot of power and this
has the potential to lead to excessive pay that bears no resemblance to performance. The empirical
evidence on CEO/chairman duality has reached mixed conclusions. For example, Core et al. (1999)
find that duality leads to higher pay in the U.S., while Conyon (1997) finds no relation in his study of
British firms.

China’s listed firms have boards of directors and their duties and responsibilities are laid out
in The Company Law of 1993 (as amended in 1999) and The Code of Corporate Governance. The
duties and responsibilities are, on the face of it, similar to those in the U.S. Because research in other
countries has reached no consensus on the impact of independence, board size, and CEO/chairman
duality on CEO pay, we present our hypotheses in null form. The hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 5: There is no relation between CEO pay and board independence (board size,
duality).
Hypothesis 6: The positive relation between pay and performance is not affected by board
independence (board size, duality).
4. Research method
4.1.

Sample
Our sample consists of non- financial companies that are listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen

stock exchanges throughout the years 1998 to 2000. The start date is the first year that listed
companies were required to disclose top management compensation. We exclude financial companies
because their financial characteristics are far different from other firms. Moreover, financial firms are
subject to more regulation and this may have an impact on CEO pay. We use the company annual
reports as our source of information for executive compensation, ownership, non-executive directors,
board size, and CEO/chairman characteristics. As the independent variables are lagged values from
year t-1 we need data from 1997. Accounting and stock market data are obtained from the CSMAR
Database. Missing annual reports and missing observatio ns on the CSMAR Database reduce the
sample size. The final sample consists of 549 companies and 1647 firm- year observations.
4.2.

Variables
The dependent variable is CEO PAY. Since 1998 listed firms have been required to disclose

the compensation of the highest paid executive in the company and we use this as a proxy for the pay

of the CEO. The CEO’s total cash compensation includes base salary, bonuses, and commissions
(unfortunately the pay is not broken down into these components). Bonus pay is likely to be a
function of firm performance, but the formula used and the actual bonus that is paid is not disclosed
(bonus pay is aggregated into total pay). We use the natural log of the CEO PAY in the regression
models.
We use two measures of performance, namely, return on assets (ROA), which is the operating
profit divided by assets, and stock return (RETURN). The first measure, ROA, is more dependent on
and more under the control of managers, and maximizing profitability is the goal or target that the
CEO strives for. We use operating profit (also known as “core earnings”) rather than net income as
the net income includes gains and losses from asset sales and inter-company transfers (also known as
“non-core earnings”); these gains and losses from asset sales and transfers are often outside the
control of the CEO and so we do not include them in our measure of performance (however,
replications of our tests using net income gives similar results and conclusions to those based on
operating profit). Problems with the return on assets measure include the encouragement of a short
term or myopic outlook at the expense of longer-term profitability, and the manipulation of
accounting numbers by managers (although operating profit is harder to manipulate than net income).
The second measure, stock return, represents the benefits to shareholders. A characteristic of stock
returns is that they are harder for managers to manipulate than earnings and they ostensibly measure
the longer-term profitability of the firm. One drawback to the use of stock returns is that share prices
are subject to the vagaries of the stock market and to changes in the macro-environment including
interest rates, inflation, and commodity prices; these factors are outside the control of the managers.
In our regressions we use lagged performance from year t-1 to explain cash compensation. Thus,
CEO PAY is determined by performance in the prior year. As a sensitivity test, we rerun our analyses

with contemporaneous performance measures; the results are broadly consistent with those derived
from lagged measures of performance.
If the state is the major shareholder in a firm then the variable STATE is coded one (1) and
zero (0) otherwise. We measure large outside investors as the collective percentage shareholdings of
the second through tenth largest shareholders; this variable is designated OUTSIDE. Firms have to
disclose the ten largest shareholders and the percentage of shares they own. The shareholders
represented by OUTSIDE are independent of the major shareholder and thus they can act as monitors
of both the CEO and the major shareholder. Firms with foreign shareholders (FOREIGN) are coded
one (1) and firms without are coded zero (0).
NONEXEC is the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. It was not until 2003
that Chinese listed firms were required to have independent directors. We use non-executive
directors as a proxy for independent directors. BOARD is the number of directors on the board.
DUAL is an indicator variable capturing cases where the CEO and chairman are the same person
(DUAL = 1) and where they are different (DUAL = 0).
The ownership and boardroom characteristics are measured at the beginning of the year and
they appear as main effects in the regression models. They are also interacted with the two
performance measures (ROA and RETURN); the interaction terms are used to test whether ownership
and board characteristics have an effect on the pay-performance relation. The interaction terms using
ROA as the measure of performance are ROA t-1 *STATE, ROAt-1*OUTSIDE , ROA t-1*FOREIGN,
ROA t-1 *NONEXEC, ROA t-1 *BOARD, and ROA t-1 *DUAL. Interaction terms using RETURN t-1 are
RETURNt-1 *STATE, RETURN t-1 *OUTSIDE, RETURNt-1 *FOREIGN, RETURNt-1 *NONEXEC,
RETURNt-1 *BOARD, and RETURN t-1 *DUAL.
We use two categories of control variables in our models. These categories are (a) operating
characteristics, and (b) other control factors. The operating characteristics are firm size (SIZE), risk

(RISK), growth opportunities (GROWTH), and debt (DEBT). Extensive research in many countries
has shown that firm size is positively and significantly associated with compensation levels (Jensen
and Murphy, 1990; Conyon, 1997; Firth et al., 1996, 1999). Complexity of the job, the skills required,
the number of hierarchical structures, and the ability to pay, all point toward large firms paying their
CEOs more. We take the natural log of the book asset value as our proxy for firm size and we
measure it as at the beginning of the year.
Lippert and Moore (1994) and Lippert and Porter (1997) find CEO compensation is higher at
firms with greater stock return volatility (risk). High business risk is passed down to the CEO (e.g.,
job tenure) and so higher compensation is demanded (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999). In our model,
RISK is defined as the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns of the company measured over
the previous 12 months. Managers are often charged with developing growth opportunities for firms
and in which case they should be rewarded for their success in this endeavor. We follow previous
researchers (e.g., Lippert and Moore, 1994) and use lagged market value to book asset value as a
proxy for growth opportunities (GROWTH). A firm with external debt is subject to monitoring by the
debt holders and so CEOs face restrictions on their managerial discretion. John and John (1993)
argue that pay policy can be used as a pre-commitment device to reduce the agency cost of debt. We
therefore include DEBT as a control variable. DEBT is defined as the book value of the long-term
debt to the book value of the shareholders’equity. RISK, GROWTH, and DEBT are measured at the
beginning of the year.
Other control factors are included in the model to account for regional and industry
differences (see Table 1 for the definitions of AREA and IND). AREAs 1 and 2 are more prosperous
and have a higher cost of living than AREAs 3 and 4. Therefore we expect CEO compensation to be
higher in AREAs 1 and 2. Industry is based on stock exchange classifications. Finally, YEAR is added
to control for time. Table 1 lists the variables and definitions used in our study.

Please Insert Table 1 Here
4.3.

Model
We use regression analysis to test the relation between pay, performance, ownership, and

boardroom variables. The general model is:
CEO PAY = a + ß1 PERFORMANCE + ß2 OWNERSHIP +ß3 BOARDROOM +ß4 OPERATING
CHARACTERISTICS +ß5 CONTROL FACTORS + e

(1)

5. Empirical results
5.1.

Sample characteristics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on compensation, firm size characteristics, the six

categories of variables proposed to explain managerial compensation, and the operating
characteristics. The median CEO compensation ranges from RMB39,000 in 1998 to RMB60,000 in
2000. CEO pay is much lower than in developed countries (see, for example, Core et al., (1999) for
the U.S.; Conyon (1997) for the U.K.; Zhou (1999) for Canada; Firth et al. (1999) for Hong Kong).
Although low by standards in the West, CEO compensation in China is approximately twelve times
higher than the average worker. This differential between the CEO’s pay and the average worker is
much higher than in some other developing countries (Jones and Mygind, 2004).
Please Insert Table 2 Here
The accounting performance measures (ROA) are very poor and show a deteriorating trend. In
contrast, however, stock returns (RETURN) are reasonable in 1998 and 1999 and very good in 2000.
It is clear that ROA and RETURN give very different indicators of a firm’
s financial performance and
they will have different pay-performance sensitivities for CEO pay. They give different indicators of
performance for a number of reasons. Stock prices are forward lo oking and incorporate investors’
expectations for the future; in contrast, ROA is a historical number. On the other hand, stock prices

are affected by interest rate changes and monetary policy, which is something the managers do not
have control over.
The state is the largest single shareholder in about 56% of the observations (STATE = 0.56).
The variable OUTSIDE has yearly medians of 9% (2000), 9% (1999), and 8% (1998). The
combined shareholdings of the second through tenth largest shareholder are generally much lower
than the ownership by the largest shareholder and so the largest shareholder has control over, or
substantial influence on, the listed firm. The proportion of the non-executive directors is about 50%
and this is comparable to the ratio of non-executive directors in the U.S. (Core et al., 1999), Britain
(Ezzamel and Watson, 1997), and Hong Kong (Firth et al., 1999). The mean board size is nine . As a
comparison, the average board size for U.S. companies is 13 (Core et al., 1999) and 9 for U.K.
companies (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997). Board size is therefore comparable to those observed in
developed countries. In 1998, approximately 32% of the board chairmen also held the position of
chief executive officer, but this ratio reduces to 22% in 1999 and 16% in 2000. The reduction in the
percentage of the dual roles is the result of an administrative instruction made in 1998 that requested
firms to separa te the roles of chairman and CEO. As a comparison, Conyon (1997) reports 23% of
firms have dual CEO and chairman roles in his U.K. sample.
5.2.

Regression results
The regression results are shown in Table 3. In panel A, we use return on assets (ROA) as our

prime performance measure, while in panel B we use stock return (RETURN). Model 1 shows the
results for performance (ROA, RETURN ), model 2 adds ownership and board variables, model 3 adds
performance interaction terms, model 4 adds control variables (but no interactions), and model 5 is
the full model. The interaction terms are used to investigate whether specific ownership structures are
associated with performance-related pay for the CEO. Correlations among the independent variables
are low to moderate (for example, all correlations are less than an absolute value of 0.40). We also

compute variance inflation factors for each variable and they are all below 3.5. These diagnostic
statistics suggest that multicollinearity is not a major problem in our models.
Please Insert Table 3 Here
We find that lagged ROA is significantly and positively associated with CEO PAY (panel A).
Note, however, that ROA alone explains just 2% of the variability in CEO PAY (model 1). The
evidence supports hypothesis 1. In panel B, howe ver, we find no relation between pay and lagged
stock return. The coefficients on STATE and OUTSIDE are negative and statistically significant,
while the coefficients on FOREIGN are positive and statistically significant. The results provide
support for hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. Firms with large boards pay their CEOs less and this result is
statistically significant. Thus the null hypothesis for BOARD is rejected. The coefficients on
NONEXEC and DUAL are not significant.
ROAt-1 *FOREIGN has positive and significant coefficients in Table 3, panel A. Thus we find
evidence that foreign- invested companies give more weight to a firm’s profitability when deciding on
the CEO’s pay. The other performance-ownership interaction terms are not significant in panels A
and B. Moreover, the STATE interaction terms have positive coefficients, which contrast with our
expectations.
In panel A, the coefficients on ROAt-1 *NONEXEC are positive and significant, which
indicates that firms that have a high proportion of non-executive directors are more likely to relate
their CEO’s pay to accounting-based performance. In contrast, the coefficients on RETURN t1 *NONEXEC

are not significant (see panel B). Firms where the CEO and the chairman is the same

person, place less weight on perfor mance as a criterion in setting the CEO’s compensation (see panel
A). Board size has no statistically significant impact on whether a CEO’s pay is based on
performance.

As expected, firm size is positive and highly significant. The debt (DEBT ) variable is
statistically significant in panel A but not in panel B. GROWTH and RISK are not significant. The
addition of the governance factors (ownership and board structure) increase R-squares to about 12
percent in panel A and 9 percent in panel B. The inclusion of the interaction terms (ownership and
performance) marginally improves the adjusted R-squares. Most significant of all, the addition of the
operating characteristics and location and industry control factors increase the R-squares from 12
percent to about 37 percent in panel A (9 percent to 32 percent in panel B) and so these factors
account for the bulk of the explanatory power of the model.
We also test our models where performance, size, growth, and debt are measured
contemporaneously. The results are similar to those shown in Table 3. In further sensitivity tests we
use the percentage of shares owned by the state (%STATE) and the percentage owned by foreigners
(%FOREIGN) in place of STATE and FOREIGN. The results from using %STATE and %FOREIGN
in the regression models are qualitatively the same as the results from using the indicator variables
STATE and FOREIGN. We also include FOREIGN and %FOREIGN in the same regression;
FOREIGN is significant and %FOREIGN is marginally significant. From these results we conclude
that the mere presence of foreign investors increases the CEO pay and the percentage of shares
owned by foreigners is of lesser importance. Given the rapidly changing nature of the Chinese
economy and the frequent changes in regulations, we also run regressions on yearly data (i.e.,
separate regressions for 1998, 1999, and 2000 data). The results are similar to those shown in Table 3.
Thus inter-temporal differences are slight.
To confirm our results on the pay- for-performance relation we examine the sensitivity of
compensation to performance by regressing change in pay on change in operating profitability and
stock return. We also estimate the elasticity of compensation with respect to performance by
regressing the change in the log of CEO pay on the change in the log of performance. We include

controls for STATE, OUTSIDE , FOREIGN, NONEXEC, BOARD, and DUAL. The results show
significant pay sensitivities and elasticities for ROA t-1 but not for RETURNt-1 . When we include
interaction terms in the models we find that the pay-performance sensitivities and elasticities are
positive and significant for ROAt-1 *FOREIGN and ROA t-1 *NONEXEC. ROAt-1*DUAL has negative
coefficients.
6. Discussion
We find that a CEO’s compensation depends, in part, on the firm’
s performance. In particular,
compensation is greater when return on assets is high. However, there is no association between stock
return and a CEO’
s pay. The emphasis on operating profits to help determine a CEO’s pay, rather
than stock returns, contrasts w ith U.S. practice. Stock returns tend to move together in China (Morck
et al., 2000) reflecting market-wide factors; firm specific factors have less influence on stock prices.
We therefore believe firms are reluctant to reward CEOs on the basis of stock returns and, instead,
use accounting-based measures of performance. Foreign- invested companies are more likely to base
the CEO’s pay on the firm’s operating profitability.
The type of owner seems to matter in explaining CEO pay; state controlled firms pay less and
foreign-invested firms pay more. CEOs of firms controlled by the state are often state bureaucrats and
they are paid in line with the senior civil servant salary levels. The trend is for the state to reduce its
ownership and for there to be more foreign investment in listed firms as China opens up its economy.
Moreover, the labor market is becoming more liquid with a greatly expanded pool of managerial
talent. All this suggests that CEO pay will rise in the coming years and fewer bureaucrats will occupy
the CEO position.
Large board size appears to constrain CEO pay although the exact reasons for this are
unknown. Boards with a large proportion of non-executive directors are more likely to implement
performance-related pay schemes for their CEOs (performance based on operating profits). Thus, the

independent or non-executive directors help to align the interests of shareholders and the CEO via the
compensation of the CEO. When one person is both the CEO and the chairman he or she has a lot of
power (and they can become entrenched). Our results show that firms with a dual CEO/chairman
place far less weight on performance-related pay. The performance (ROA) and boardroom
interactions show that the internal governance structure does play a role in incentivizing top
management by making CEO pay contingent on the firm’s performance.
7. Conclusion
A central theme of the debate on top management pay is whether compensation is related to
firm performance. This question is very important in China because merit based pay was an alien
concept under the central planning system that existed prior to the economic reforms. We find a
positive relation between CEO compensation and performance based on return on assets (ROA).
Ownership structure has a significant influence on pay. In particular, firms with substantial
government ownership and firms with large outside investors have lower CEO compensation. The
presence of a foreign shareholder is associated with higher CEO pay. There is statistically significant
evidence consistent with foreign shareholders pressuring firms to adopt performance-related pay
schemes that are based on profitability. Firms with large boards pay their CEOs less and this result
contrasts with the predictions of Jensen (1993). The results are consistent with non-executive
directors, our proxy for independent directors, encouraging the use of performance-related pay while
CEO/chairman duality reduces the use of performance-related compensation.
One of the problems in carrying out empirical research on China’s listed firms is the paucity
of data especially when compared to North America and some Western nations. For example, unlike
some other countries, total compensation is not broken down into salary, benefits, and bonuses. We
do not know for sure if bonuses are paid but we can infer them because of the statistical link between
operating profitability and compensation (and because of evidence from studies that use survey data

on SOEs). We cannot identify independent directors in our sample (the data do not become available
until 2003) and so we use non-executive directors as a proxy. Another limitation of our study is that
the compensation of the CEO is not directly given. Therefore we assume the highest paid executive is
the CEO. These and other limitations can be overcome in the future as and when more detailed
disclosure is made.
While China’s economic growth is envied by many, the profitability of individual listed firms
has been lamentable. One cause of poor performance is the lack of incentives for top management.
We therefore believe it is crucial that CEOs be rewarded on the basis of their firms’performances.
One policy implication of our study is that firms should increase the number of truly independent
non-executive directors on the board. We believe this will result in a greater use of performancebased pay for the CEO. Another implication of the study is that firms should be discouraged from
having a joint CEO/chairman as this reduces the use of performance-based pay. Unlike other
countries, stock options are not granted in China. The lack of executive stock options is a missing
ingredient in the design of incentive systems that align the interests of managers and investors3 . This
is something that the Chinese government and its economic planners need to redress. The lack of
stock options as a reward mechanism is exacerbated by the very low share ownership by CEOs and
top executives. To reap the full rewards of privatization, the state needs to step back from using
political considerations in appointing and controlling CEOs. A thoroughly independent appointments
committee may help in this regard. Allied to this, however, there must be a concerted effort to
improve the incentives and rewards for CEOs. Without adequate top management rewards, the efforts
exerted in economic restructuring may be in vain.

3

Note, however, that executive stock options do not always lead to improved future performance (McGuire and Matta,

2003).

Governments and other stakeholders should encourage firms, or even mandate them, to
provide more extensive financial disclosures on top executive pay. The increasing autonomy given to
managers needs to be balanced with more accountability and transparency. Good corporate
governance mechanisms can do a lot to enhance the effectiveness of the CEO. Improving financial
transparency help s investors in their monitoring and oversight roles.
China’s listed firms are evolving fast as are its business practices and corporate governa nce.
These rapid changes provide a lot of scope for future research. Increasing disclosure by firms (e.g.,
the breakdown of pay into base salary and bonuses) and by the state reducing constraints on the forms
of CEO pay (e.g., stock options) will facilitate future research in CEO pay. China’s brand of
economic reforms is exportable to other developing countries. However before this happens, more
scientific study is necessary so that we have a better understanding of how the reforms work and how
they impact incentives and rewards.
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Variables
Compensation
Executive
compensation
Performance
Return on assets
Stock return

TABLE 1
Variable Definitions, Proxies, and their Predicted Relationships
Definition
CEO PAY Natural log of the cash payment

ROA
RETURN

Operating profit /total assets
Annual stock return

STATE
OUTSIDE
FOREIG
N
NONEXE
C
BOARD
DUAL

Equal to 1 if the state is the largest shareholder in the company
Percentage of shares owned by the second largest to tenth largest stockholder
Equal to 1 if the company issues foreign shares

Natural log of total assets
Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over 12 months
Market value/book value of assets

Long term debt ratio

SIZE
RISK
GROWT
H
DEBT

Other Variables
Area 1

AREA1

Equal to 1 for companies registered in Shanghai or Shenzhen

Governance Structure
State ownership
Outside ownership
Foreign share
Board composition
Board size
Duality
Operating
Characteristics
Firm size
Equity risk
Growth opportunity

Percentage of non-executive directors on the board
The number of directors on the board
Equal to 1 if the chairman also serves as the CEO

Book value of long term debt/book value of shareholders’equity
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Area 2

AREA2

Area 3

AREA3

Area 4

AREA4

Industry 1
Industry 2
Industry 3
Industry 4
Industry 5

IND1
IND2
IND3
IND4
IND5

Equal to 1 for companies registered in the coastal provinces including Beijing
and Tianjin
Equal to 1 for companies registered in the inland provinces (i.e., except those in
Areas 1, 2 & 4)
Equal to 1 for companies registered in the less developed regions (including the
provinces of Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Tibet, Yunnan
and Guizhou)
Equal to 1 for the utilities sector
Equal to 1 for the properties sector
Equal to 1 for the conglomerates (composites) sector
Equal to 1 for the industrial and manufacturing sector
Equal to 1 for the commercial sector
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Variables
CEO PAY (000s)

Firm Characteristics
Net Income (million)

Sales (million)

Assets (million)

Shareholders' Funds (million)

Performance
Operating profitability % (ROA)

Stock Return % (RETURN)

Ownership and Board
Structure
State Ownership (STATE)

Outside Ownership (OUTSIDE)

Foreign Share Ownership
(FOREIGN)

Board Composition (NONEXEC)

Board Size ( BOARD)

Duality (DUAL)

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Year Mean Median
2000
1999
1998

85
69
52

60
50
39

9
9
8

1000
660
446

Standard
Deviation
86.83
73.97
47.68

2000
1999
1998
2000
1999
1998
2000
1999
1998
2000
1999
1998

45
43
36
918
780
697
1706
1534
1422
811
728
693

32
31
32
442
368
327
1083
914
853
507
441
429

-934
-956
-1044
0
-30
-52
114
123
119
-1334
-1299
-320

1523
835
2004
20467
14386
11602
22099
21908
22209
13817
12958
12581

157
124
155
1679
1363
1205
2152
2075
2017
1245
1170
1072

2000
1999
1998
2000
1999
1998

2.83
3.41
3.90
74.31
22.23
13.49

4.53
4.87
5.12
63.93
13.09
7.35

-91.20
-49.83
-41.62
-28.80
-45.07
-53.66

29.82
34.21
35.10
440.16
391.29
413.78

9.81
8.70
8.34
56.26
42.96
45.26

2000
1999
1998
2000
1999
1998
2000

0.56
0.55
0.57
0.16
0.17
0.17
0.16

1
1
1
0.09
0.09
0.08
0

0
0
0
0.03
0.02
0.02
0

1
1
1
0.74
0.73
0.71
1

0.50
0.50
0.50
0.21
0.20
0.20
0.37

1999
1998
2000
1999
1998
2000
1999
1998
2000

0.16
0.16
0.51
0.50
0.52
9.46
9.66
9.73
0.16

0
0
0.56
0.56
0.56
9
9
9
0

0
0
0
0
0
5
5
5
0

1
1
1
1
1
18
19
19
1

0.37
0.37
0.26
0.26
0.29
2.62
2.73
2.86
0.37
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Min

Max

Operating Characteristics
SIZE (log of total assets)

Equity Risk (RISK )

GROWTH

Long term debt/equity ratio
(DEBT)

1999
1998

0.22
0.32

0
0

0
0

1
1

0.41
0.47

2000
1999
1998
2000
1999
1998
2000
1999
1998
2000
1999
1998

7.01
6.89
6.83
0.12
0.15
0.12
3.69
2.47
2.62
0.11
0.07
0.13

6.98
6.81
6.75
0.11
0.13
0.12
3.14
2.12
1.95
0.03
0.01
0.04

4.74
4.81
4.78
0.03
0.02
0.04
0
0
0
-2.59
-2.81
-0.25

10.00
9.99
10.01
0.67
0.45
2.01
18.27
13.19
24.21
2.01
6.32
3.78

0.88
0.87
0.85
0.07
0.07
0.28
2.39
1.53
4.87
0.29
0.39
0.27

TABLE 3
Regression of Compensation on Performance, Ownership, and Board Characteristics
[reduce regression coefficients and intercepts to two decimal places]
Panel A: Performance is measured by ROA t-1
Variables
Intercept
Performanc e
ROA t-1
Ownership and Board
Structure
STATE
OUTSIDE
FOREIGN
NONEXEC
BOARD
DUAL

1
4.790***
(28.029)

2
4.294***
(24.251)

3
4.306***
(18.955)

4
2.536***
(13.871)

5
2.507***
(13.632)

0.110**
(2.328)

0.113**
(2.168)

0.097**
(2.067)

0.123***
(3.488)

0.118**
(2.194)

-0.179***
(-4.339)
-0.395**
(-2.170)
0.366***
(3.402)
0.073
(0.902)
-0.026*
(-1.890)
0.118
(1.444)

-0.201***
(-4.320)
-0.258***
(-2.991)
0.352***
(2.841)
0.068
(0.833)
-0.025**
(-2.361)
0.119
(1.455)

-0.181***
(-4.937)
-0.331***
(-3.466)
0.145**
(2.689)
-0.082
(-1.114)
-0.037***
(-4.127)
0.015
(0.352)

-0.219***
(-5.070)
-0.317***
(-4.695)
0.135**
(2.503)
-0.089
(-1.196)
-0.034***
(-5.074)
-0.018
(-0.391)

Performance Interactions
ROA t-1*STATE

0.039
(1.002)
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0.016
(1.308)

ROA t-1*OUTSIDE

0.013
(0.341)
0.011*
(1.907)
0.107**
(2.136)
0.009
(1.366)
-0.013*
(-1.741)

ROA t-1*FOREIGN
ROA t-1*NONEXEC
ROA t-1*BOARD
ROA t-1*DUAL
Operating Characteristics
SIZE
RISK
GROWTH
DEBT
Other variables
AREA
IND
YEAR
Adjusted R2

0.02

0.117
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0.126

0.036
(0.412)
0.012**
(1.963)
0.115**
(2.003)
0.007
(0.985)
-0.008**
(-1.967)
0.254***
(10.479)
0.159
(0.511)
0.007
(1.211)
-0.146**
(-2.396)

0.256***
(10.495)
0.213
(0.672)
0.005
(1.288)
-0.144**
(-2.330)

√
√
√
0.345

√
√
√
0.366

Panel B: Performance is measured by RETURN t-1
Inte rcept
Performance
RETURN t-1
Ownership and Board
Structure
STATE
OUTSIDE
FOREIGN
NONEXEC
BOARD
DUAL

4.207
(40.723)

4.358***
(27.249)

4.375***
(27.156)

2.410***
(11.238)

2.439***
(11.184)

0.007
(0.133)

0.009
(0.179)

0.086
(0.516)

0.048
(0.621)

0.017
(0.214)

-0.161***
(-3.215)
-0.401***
(-3.026)
0.535***
(3.138)
0.054
(0.551)
-0.022
(-1.393)
-0.021
(-0.325)

-0.182***
(-3.337)
-0.358***
(-3.201)
0.573***
(3.262)
0.051
(0.516)
-0.021
(-1.362)
-0.016
(-0.252)

-0.164***
(-3.717)
-0.435***
(-3.297)
0.117**
(2.033)
-0.106
(-1.197)
-0.032***
(-3.863)
0.064
(1.127)

-0.198***
-(4.027)
-0.313***
(-3.004)
0.150**
(2.217)
-0.113
(-1.207)
-0.032***
(-3.808)
0.062
(1.095)

Performance Interactions
RETURN t-1*STATE

0.113
(1.017)
0.137
(1.294)
0.366
(1.474)
0.009
(0.832)
0.003
(0.480)
-0.006
(-0.814)

RETURN t-1*OUTSIDE
RETURN t-1*FOREIGN
RETURN t-1*NONEXEC
RETURN t-1*BOARD
RETURN t-1*DUAL
Operating Characteristics
SIZE
RISK
GROWTH
DEBT
Other variables
AREA

30

0.149
(1.573)
0.006
(0.081)
0.286
(1.595)
0.012
(0.893)
0.001
(0.385)
-0.013
(-1.264)
0.277***
(9.866)
0.047
(0.136)
0.004
(0.769)
-0.095
(-1.317)

0.280***
(9.853)
0.041
(0.119)
0.005
(0.749)
-0.097
(-1.361)

√

√

IND
YEAR
Adjusted R2

0.001

0.086

0.089

√
√
0.316

√
√
0.317

Table 3 shows the coefficients from a regression using the following model:
CEO PAY = α + β 1PERFORMANCE t-1 + β 2OWNERSHIP + β 3BOARD
STRUCTURE + β4 OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS + β5 CONTROL
FACTORS +ε.
CEO PAY = the natural log of cash payment; ROA = operating profit in year t-1 divided by total
assets; RETURN = annual stock return in year t-1; STATE = a dummy variable coded one (1) if
the state is the largest shareholder in the company; OUTSIDE = percentage of shares owned by
the second large st to tenth largest shareholder; FOREIGN = a dummy variable equal to one (1) if
the company has issued foreign shares; NONEXEC = the proportion of unpaid directors to total
number of directors on the board; BOARD = the number of directors on the board; DUAL = a
dummy variable if the chairman also serves as CEO; SIZE = the natural log of total assets; RISK
= the standard deviation of the monthly stock return; GROWTH = the ratio of market value to
book value of assets; DEBT = book value of the long term debt to book value of the
shareholders’equity.
√ indicates area, industry, and year controls (AREA, IND, YEAR) have been included.
t-statistics are provided in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01 levels, (two tailed test
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